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Summary 
Valuations in 2011 and 2014 shown the scheme to have an increasing deficit: from £2.9 
billion in 2011 to £5.3 billion in 2014 (2017 Annual Report). 
In September 2017, the USS Trustee launched a 4-week consultation with Universities UK 
(UUK) on the assumptions it would take for the 2017 valuation. It proposed a “prudent” 
approach to the assumptions on investment returns, based on the key assumption that, 
although recent investment returns had higher than expected, they were likely to reduce 
in future. (Other things being equal, assuming a lower level of return on investments 
increases the level of contributions required to meet the cost of benefits). (USS, 2017 
Actuarial Valuation, 1 Sept 2017, p7). 
 
However, UUK’s response indicated that the Trustee should take an even more cautious 
approach to risk – which would entail assuming a lower income from investments and 
therefore requiring a higher level of contributions. (UUK responds to USS consultation on 
funding proposals). 
A report by First Actuarial for the University and College Union (UCU) said the Trustee’s 
approach created a vicious circle: 
The risk is that the more the employers say they do not wish to take risk (where the 
risk they are mainly concerned about is the risk of their immediate contribution rate 
going up) the more the trustee interprets this as meaning they must set a higher 
funding target and lower “investment risk”, two actions which are guaranteed to put 
the employers’ contribution rate up. 
It argued that the cash-flow into the scheme meant there was “no need to change either 
the contribution rate or the benefits to have a prudent funding plan.” 
On 17 November 2017, UUK proposed closing the defined benefit scheme to future 
accruals. In future, members would build-up of future benefits through a defined 
contribution scheme.  
The Joint Negotiating Committee (made up of equal numbers of representatives from 
UUK and the UCU and an independent chair) agreed to UUK’s revised reform proposals, 
on the casting vote of the chair. This decision results in an estimated funding deficit of 
£6.1 billion, which means the scheme is 91% funded. Employers will now hold a 
consultation with members on the possible impact of the changes on individuals. Any 
changes would not come into force until April 2019. (USS, Proposed changes to future 
USS benefits). 
The UCU has planned escalating strike action, following a ballot in which 88% voted for 
strike action on a turnout of 58% (UCU press releases: 29 January and 22 January 2018). 
 
4 Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) 
1. Background 
The Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) is one of the largest 
private schemes in the UK.1 It is a multi-employer pension scheme, 
covering over 350 employers in the higher education sector and 
provides pensions for academic and other university staff. It is a funded 
trust-based defined benefit (DB) scheme. It has 396,278 members: 
190,546 active members; 66,419 pensioner members and 139,313 
deferred members.2  
The scheme was reformed in 2016 (following the 2014 valuation which 
showed the scheme to be in deficit). The old final salary scheme was 
closed to future accruals and a new scheme introduced, which provides 
benefits based on career average revalued earnings. Key features of the 
USS Retirement Income Builder are that: 
 
• Members start to accrue benefits at a rate of 1/75 of each year’s 
salary (up to the salary threshold - £55,000 in 2017/18) plus a tax-
free cash lump sum at retirement of 3 x annual pension; 
• Members contribute at a rate of 8% of salary. 
• The normal pension age is 65 (with plans for this to rise in future 
in line with the State Pension age). 
In October 2016, USS Investment Builder, a new DC arrangement was 
introduced for members with salaries in excess of the £55,000 threshold 
and for the investment of additional voluntary contributions.  
Benefits build up before April 2016 were calculated based on salary and 
length of service at that point. The pension and cash value resulting 
from this calculation is revalued to retirement. At retirement, the 
resulting “service credit” is added to any further benefits accrued under 
the scheme from April 2016 onwards. 3 
Detailed guides about the scheme are on the USS website. 
                                                                                             
1  Employers propose reforms to ensure USS pension scheme remains sustainable and 
attractive to members, UUK press release, 17 November 2017 
2  USS Annual Report and Accounts 2017 
3  USS, Benefits earned before April 2016 
5 Commons Library Briefing, 20 February 2018 
2. Scheme valuations  
Defined Benefit occupational pension schemes need to be valued 
periodically – at least every three years. The purpose is to the value of its 
assets and how much it needs to be able to pay pensions as they fall 
due. Where a scheme is in deficit, the trustees must draw up a 
“recovery plan” and send this to the Pensions Regulator.4  
 
The USS Trustee explains the approach to USS valuations as follows: 
The process begins with an assessment of the financial strength of 
our sponsoring employers. 
This is the foundation of the valuation as it shows the trustee just 
how much financial support employers can provide to the scheme 
and how much investment risk could be taken. (The level of 
investment risk to be taken is set following detailed discussions 
with employers). 
For this year’s valuation, for example, we undertook a very 
detailed study informed by independent expert advice which 
concluded that, despite uncertainty about the short-term impact 
of Brexit, the employers’ ability to provide financial support for the 
scheme remains strong – and can be expected to continue to be 
so for at least 30 years. 
Another key part of the process is estimating how much money 
we think we will need in order to provide the current level of 
benefits. 
There is no easy answer, so we look at a wide range of data and 
identify trends to predict what might happen in the future, with 
the main areas being: 
• The level of return we can expect from our investments; 
• Price inflation and, in turn, how much pensions might 
increase; 
• How much you might earn in the future and therefore pay 
into your pension over your working life; 
• How long you might live and be claiming your pension; and 
Whether you have any beneficiaries who might also receive a 
pension after your death. […] 
Employer (UUK) and UCU representatives will, through the Joint 
Negotiating Committee…look to reach agreement on any 
changes required to contribution rates, future benefits, or both. If 
any changes are agreed by the committee, employers will then 
consult with affected employees. 
At the end of the process we will have agreed a strategy of 
contributions, benefits and investments as well as a realistic plan 
to recover the existing deficit.5 
For more detail, see the introduction to the consultation on the 2017 
valuation. 
                                                                                             
4  Pensions Act 2004, Part 3 
5  USS website/the 2017 valuation/questions and answers/how do you estimate how 
much you’ll need in order to pay pensions 
For more 
information, see  
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2.1 Valuations in 2011 and 2014 
Recent valuations of the USS have shown an increasing deficit: 
• The 2011 actuarial valuation showed a £2.9 billion deficit and a 
92% funding ratio. A 10-year recovery plan was adopted to 
address this.6 
• The 2014 valuation showed a £5.3 billion deficit and an 89% 
funding ratio. A longer recovery plan of 17 years was adopted.7 
The 2014 valuation reflected reforms to future benefit accrual discussed 
in section 1 above, which “reduced the deficit by £5.2 bn.”8 
 
In a response to chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, Frank Field, 
the Pensions Regulator explained that early engagement with large 
schemes was part of its risk-based approach and that it had been 
continuously engaged with the USS since 2010. It said: 
Whilst it is difficult to measure the impact of our engagement on 
any scheme with certainty, we believe we made a significant 
contribution to the development of the USS approach in the 
context of the 2011 and 2014 valuations. Our interventions on 
risk management and risk allocation helped to set an overarching 
set of risk and funding principles for the USS. These principles 
include: 
• The principle that the pension risk within the USS should be 
proportionate to the amount of financial support available 
from its sponsoring employers, and specifically that there 
should be no increase in the reliance placed on that 
support over time; and 
• An express intention to take opportunities for long term, 
gradual risk reduction given the right economic conditions 
and following appropriate dialogue.9 
2.2 The 2017 valuation 
As discussed below, the deficit as at 31 March 2017 would depend on 
the assumptions used and the decision taken on future benefits. 
 
Summary 
Based on the valuation assumptions developed at the 2014 valuation, the deficit at March 2017 would 
have been £12.7 billion.  
The assumptions that the USS Trustee consulted on in September 2017 meant an estimated deficit of 
£5.1 billion.   
Following consultation with UUK, a more cautious approach to the assumptions on investment returns 
resulted in an estimated funding deficit of £7.5bn. 
The JNC’s decision on benefit reform on 23 January 2018 resulted in an estimated funding deficit of 
£6.1 billion. 
(UUK, USS valuation – questions and answers; USS, Proposed changes to future USS benefits) 
 
                                                                                             
6  USS Annual Report and Accounts 2012, p2 
7  USS Annual Report and Accounts 2017, p104  
8  Letter from the TPR to chair of the work and pensions committee, September 2017 
9  Letter from the TPR to chair of the work and pensions committee, September 2017 
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Consultation on the assumptions 
In September 2017, the Trustee launched a 4-week consultation with 
Universities UK (UUK) on the assumptions it would take for the 2017 
valuation.10  It proposed a “prudent” approach to the assumptions on 
investment returns, which would result in an increase in the 
contributions required: 
Our prudent proposals – based on a fundamental building blocks 
analysis of future investment returns and the maximum available 
risk budget – forecast average annual returns of CPI + 0.9% and 
resulted in a funding deficit of £5.1bn (92% funded). 
On this approach, the current combined contribution rate of 26% 
of payroll (8% employee; 18% employer) would have to increase 
by between 6% and 7% in order to maintain the current level of 
benefits.11 
An important factor in this was that although investment returns had 
been higher than expected,12 these were likely to reduce in future: 
Since 2014, the investment environment has been much more 
challenging than anticipated: yields on government bonds (gilts) 
have fallen further than ever before as governments around the 
world have bought them in order to inject money into struggling 
economies. 
The reduced availability of government bonds has caused 
investors, particularly those linked to pension funds like USS, to 
seek other forms of steady, inflation-linked returns. 
USS was already operating successfully in these alternative 
markets – but the continued pressure in the gilts market has 
prompted other investors to follow suit, with the effect of driving 
prices up and, in turn, potential future returns down. 
So while the investment team has continued to be successful 
against the benchmarks set, its expectations of how successful it 
can be in future reflect the reduced returns available in the 
markets. 
This expected future investment return forms an important part of 
the valuation of the scheme’s liabilities, as we subtract the 
amount we can reasonably expect USS to make in future from the 
total cost of providing pensions to give us a present day view of 
the scheme funding level.13 
On its “best estimate” view (a 50% probability that investment 
forecasts are met or exceeded), the scheme had a surplus of £8.3 
billion. However, the trustee had a “legal duty to be prudent in its 
funding assumptions.” With a confidence level of 67%, the scheme had 
a deficit of just over £5 billion.14  
                                                                                             
10  USS 2017 Actuarial Valuation. A consultation with Universities UK on the proposed 
assumptions for the scheme’s technical provisions and Statement of Funding 
Principles, 1 September 2017; USS, 2017 Report and Accounts, p14 
11  USS, UUK response to USS’s consultation on funding proposals, 2017 
12  £18.2 bn, compared to £7.2 bn, decreasing the deficit by around £11 billion over 
this period 
13  USS website/the 2017 valuation/questions and answers/why are you expecting such 
poor investment returns in future 
14  USS website, Consultation with Universities UK (UUK) commences; USS, In the news  
USS’s 2017 valuation 
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Another important factor in its judgement was the volatility in 
contributions employers would be prepared to support. It had decided 
to stick with its ‘Test 1’ approach, whereby it would try to keep funding 
levels within a defined distance of self-sufficiency. This would involve 
moving to lower risk investments from year 11, with the aim of 
reducing the reliance on employers to £10bn in 20 years’ time, 
compared to £23bn in March 2017.15  
Tests 
The Trustee has developed three tests for its valuations, based on three guiding principles: 
• Reliance on the sector. That over a period of 20 years, the USS should not increase its reliance on 
the sector and should if possible reduce it. 
• Stability of contributions. There should be a high probability that the employer contribution rate 
will not exceed 18% of salaries over a three-year period and a very high probability that it will 
not exceed 21%.  
• Investment risk and tail risk. The balance sheet of the scheme’s participating employers should be 
able to cover the impact which a rare set of adverse circumstances (tail risk) may have on the 
funding position of the scheme. (USS, Proposed Approach to the Methodology for the 2017 
Actuarial Valuation, 2016, p13) 
 
Test 1 measures the reliance being placed on the covenant (i.e; the willingness and ability of the 
participating employers to support the scheme). Specifically, Test 1 measures the difference between 
the technical provisions (liabilities) and the amount of assets that would be required for ‘self-
sufficiency.’ The aim is that there should be a low probability of requiring further contributions from 
employers to pay for accrued pensions after 20 years. It entails moving to a low-risk portfolio over 20 
years, with asset risk reduced on a uniform basis from year 10. (Ibid, p12; and Consultation on the 
2017 valuation, p20). 
 
Test 2 measures the likelihood (probability) of the need to increase contributions at the next valuation. 
This reflects the employers’ preference for a stable contribution rate and desire for a low probability of 
contributions exceeding 18%, and a very low probability of exceeding 21%, in three years’ time. 
 
Test 3 test provides comfort to the trustee that in the event of an extreme tail risk event, the sector has 
sufficient aggregate balance sheet assets to cover the benefits promised to existing members. 
 
UUK response 
In response, UUK said the Trustee should take a still more cautious 
approach, incorporating a level of investment de-risking over the first 
ten years of the funding plan. It said this would provide “greater 
protection should another adverse event occur, but also slightly reduces 
expected future investment returns.”16 
The Trustee revised its proposed assumptions, with the result that the 
estimated deficit increased to £7.5 billion: 
USS, as trustee, outlined the maximum level of risk we could 
contemplate taking in funding the scheme on a prudent basis (a 
statutory requirement). 
This was based on independent expert analysis of the levels of 
future contributions that could be afforded ‘in extremis’ by 
                                                                                             
15  UUK, Employers propose reforms to ensure USS pension scheme remains sustainable 
and attractive to members, 17 November 2017, p9 
16  UUK, USS valuation questions and answers February 2016, p14 
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participating employers, should the funding assumptions 
ultimately prove inadequate. 
We then sought employers’ views as to whether taking the 
maximum level of risk was appropriate – crucial to how we set the 
level of contributions to fund the pension. 
Our prudent proposals – based on a fundamental building blocks 
analysis of future investment returns and the maximum available 
risk budget – forecast average annual returns of CPI + 0.9% and 
resulted in a funding deficit of £5.1bn (92% funded). 
On this approach, the current combined contribution rate of 26% 
of payroll (8% employee; 18% employer) would have to increase 
by between 6% and 7% in order to maintain the current level of 
benefits. 
UUK’s responses indicated to us that we should take a more 
moderate approach to risk. The trustee board accordingly agreed 
to retain the 2014 approach to de-risk the scheme’s investments 
over the next 20 years. In practice, over time, this means holding 
slightly fewer growth-seeking assets and more fixed income 
assets, which in turn results in a marginally lower income from 
investments to fund the current level of benefits and recover the 
funding deficit. 
As a result, the board agreed a revised future average annual 
returns forecast of CPI + 0.71%, resulting in a funding deficit of 
£7.5bn (89% funded). Maintaining the current level of benefits 
would, in turn, require a combined contribution rate of 37.4% of 
pay, including increasing deficit recovery contributions from 2.1% 
of pay currently to 6%.17 
UUK has produced a USS valuation – questions and answers. 
UCU response 
In a report for the UCU, First Actuarial argues that running a pension 
scheme was a matter of cash flow management. Focusing on cash 
flows, shows what needs to be achieved with the investments.18 A key 
objective of the employers (that their contribution rate should not go 
above 18%) was captured by Test 2 above. 
Based on analysis of cash flows in the USS, it said the existing 
contribution rate remained prudent for the current design of the 
scheme: 
In a scenario of “best estimate” pay rises, the benefits of the USS 
can very nearly be paid from contributions, without reliance on 
the assets. There is no need to change either the contribution rate 
or the benefits to have a prudent funding plan. The strong 
likelihood is that the USS can be invested to outperform the 
return required to safely deliver the benefits. Given time, the 
outperformance will increase the funding level to any desired 
target. Any formulation of the sign off of the valuation which 
maintains the current contribution rate and the current benefits is 
acceptable.19 
                                                                                             
17  USS, UUK response to the USS’s consultation on funding proposals, 2017 
18  First Actuarial, Report for UCU. Progressing the valuation of the USS, 15 September 
2017, p3 
19  Ibid 
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If this were agreed (and the authors hoped they had demonstrated it) 
there were ways in which the parameters for the valuation and the 
USS’s three funding tests can be adjusted. For example, the deficit 
recovery period could be lengthened and the assumed return on 
investments could be increased. Targets to deliver an overall return of at 
least 1.9% pa relative to CPI would keep the scheme on track: 
Investments chosen to deliver an income of at least 1.0% pa and 
an overall return of at least 1.9% pa real relative to CPI will keep 
the scheme on track (2.1% pa real if investment performance is to 
pay for longevity improvements). These are not difficult targets. A 
better long run return will improve the funding level and help 
attain any desired funding target without the need for additional 
contributions.20 
It argued that switching to low risk/low return investments (as closed 
schemes do to manage their cash flow, at high cost to their sponsor) did 
not need to be done until the scheme was closed, if it ever is.21 The 
Trustee’s proposed approach risked a vicious circle: 
The risk is that the more the employers say they do not wish to 
take risk (where the risk they are mainly concerned about is the 
risk of their immediate contribution rate going up) the more the 
trustee interprets this as meaning they must set a higher funding 
target and lower “investment risk”, two actions which are 
guaranteed to put the employers’ contribution rate up. To control 
the employers’ cost, the members’ future benefits are then likely 
to be cut.  
If we keep going around this circle without regard to other 
objectives, such as the cost-efficient provision of benefits, the end 
point will be such benefit accruals as can be afforded using a gilt 
yield discount rate and investment strategy. The advantages of 
having an open scheme with sponsoring employers of excellent 
aggregate covenant will have been discarded.22 
 
                                                                                             
20  Ibid 
21  Ibid, p7 
22   Ibid, p7  
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3. Proposed benefit reforms 
On 17 November 2017, UUK proposed closing the existing scheme to 
future accruals. In future, members would build up benefits in a defined 
contribution scheme - USS Investment Builder. It said: 
Employers are proposing a solution that avoids any increase in 
costs for members and ensures that money is not diverted from 
other core activities, such as teaching or research.  
USS, one of the largest private schemes in the UK, provides 
pensions for academic and other university staff. Difficult 
economic circumstances have resulted in an increased deficit 
alongside a significant increase in the cost of future defined 
pension benefits of more than a third since 2014.  
A sustainable solution to the funding challenges facing USS needs 
to be found. This has been clearly emphasised by the Pensions 
Regulator, who wrote to USS Trustees in September expressing 
concerns. This is important as the Regulator is obliged to evaluate 
the valuation outcome.23 
Revised proposals tabled in January would mean: 
From 1 April 2019 (at the earliest):  
• The salary threshold (the salary up to which defined 
benefits currently build up) would reduce to zero;  
• All future benefits, until further review, would be built up 
in the USS Investment Builder (the defined contribution part 
of the scheme), except death in service and ill health 
retirement benefits – see below; 
• There would be no changes to the provision of death in 
service or ill health retirement benefits. These would remain 
based on full salary regardless of the salary threshold; 
• The employer contribution would cover their cost of future 
benefits in the USS Investment Builder (13.25%), as well as 
death and incapacity benefits, the subsidy of investment 
management charges, deficit recovery contributions, and 
scheme running costs;  
• Members would continue to contribute 8% of pay, but 
would have access to a lower cost option of contributing 
4% while still receiving the full employer contribution into 
the USS Investment Builder of 13.25%;  
• Members’ 8% (or 4%) would include a contribution to 
partly finance their death in service and ill health retirement 
benefits. 
• The ‘match’ – the additional 1% employer contribution 
currently available when members contribute an additional 
1% to the USS Investment Builder – would be 
discontinued.24 
                                                                                             
23  Employers propose reforms to ensure USS pension scheme remains sustainable and 
attractive to members, UUK press release, 17 November 2017 
24  USS, Proposed changes to future USS benefits 
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As an alternative, the UCU proposed reducing the benefit accrual rate 
but keeping other benefits the same.25 
Expected impact  
On 18 January 2018, a group of senior academics wrote to the Times 
expressing their concern about the proposed reforms. They said the 
proposals would mean: 
[…] the replacement of guaranteed pensions with a defined 
contribution scheme that will be wholly dependent on movements 
in stocks and shares. First Actuarial estimates that a typical 
lecturer will receive £208,000 less under the proposals than 
presently. For universities that rely on the USS to help recruit and 
retain staff this will be a disaster, with lecturers enjoying 
retirement income of an estimated £400,000 less than their 
colleagues in the rival Teachers’ Pension Scheme, which mainly 
enrols staff in post-92 universities.26 
The UCU says the changes would leave “a typical lecturer almost 
£10,000 a year worse off in retirement than under the current set-
up.”27 
UUK questions the claim that individuals could be £200,000 worse off, 
saying that it is being quoted without any indication of the assumed 
level of investment return. It commissioned its own modelling, which 
suggested that: 
Under the proposals, and including standard state pension 
entitlements, current members should continue to receive 
retirement incomes equivalent to 80-90% of those that would, 
hypothetically, have been received under the current benefits.28  
Further modelling from USS, including an interactive benefit 
modeller will be included in the employee consultation on benefit 
reform, which starts in mid-March. 
Further modelling from USS will be included in the employee 
consultation on benefit reform.29 
3.1 Decision of the Joint Negotiating 
Committee 
On 23 January 2018, the Joint Negotiating Committee (made up of 
equal numbers of representatives of UUK and the UCU, with an 
independent chair) agreed – on the casting vote of the chair – to UUK’s 
reform proposals. UUK said the decision was a “necessary step to put 
the scheme on a sustainable footing for the long-term”: 
UUK has designed a lower-cost saving option to ensure that USS 
remains a suitable scheme for all. In this option, members can pay 
contributions of 4% rather than 8% of salary while still 
                                                                                             
25  USS Valuation – questions and answers 
26  Letter: shrinking pensions could lead to retirement disaster, Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 18 January 2018; UCU website; UCU 1,000 professors on the 
importance of USS 
27   UCU, Over 1 million students will be affected by university pensions strikes, 20 
February 2018 
28  USS Valuation – questions and answers 
29  Ibid; USS Benefit Reform: Modelling member outcomes, December 2017 
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benefitting from the 18% employer contribution. USS would 
continue to offer very valuable life assurance and substantial 
benefits in the event of ill-health. 
Pension benefits already built up are protected by law and cannot 
be changed retrospectively.30   
This decision resulted in an “estimated funding deficit of £6.1 billion, 
which means the scheme is 91% funded.”31 
Employers will now hold a consultation with members – expected to run 
for 60 days from mid-late March – on the possible impact of these 
changes on individuals. Any changes would not come into force until 1 
April 2019.32 
3.2 Planned strike action 
On 22 January 2018, the UCU announced that turnout for the ballot 
had been 58%, with 88% voting for strike action and 93% for action 
short of a strike.33  
On 23 January, it expressed its disappointment at the way the talks had 
ended: 
The chair sided with the employers' representatives and their 
plans to transform the scheme from one with a guaranteed 
retirement income to a defined contribution scheme where 
pension income is subject to changes in the stock market. The 
union said it was disappointed that the talks ended with the 
changes being imposed on USS members.34   
Its higher education committee (HEC) agreed escalating strike action in 
the event of an unsatisfactory outcome to the talks.35 
On 7 February UCU general secretary Sally Hunt said employers had had 
yet shown “no sign of moving away from their hard-line position of 
wanting to remove the right to a guaranteed pension.”36 
 
                                                                                             
30  Proposals agreed to reform USS Pensions, 23 January 2018;  
31  USS, Proposed changes to future USS benefits 
32  Ibid 
33  UCU website, USS ballot results announced, 22 January 2018 
34  UCU website, Strikes now likely as talks end without an agreement, 23 January 
2018 
35  UCU website, USS strike action agreed, 22 January 2018 
36  UCU, Employers refuse to engage, 7 February 2018 
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4. Questions in Parliament 
On 22 December 2017, Universities Minister, Jo Johnson said the 
Government had no role in relation to the USS: 
Universities are autonomous institutions and they are responsible 
for their own pension provision. Government has no role in 
relation to the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) beyond 
regulation as is applied to all workplace pension schemes by The 
Pensions Regulator. Neither my Rt hon. Friend the Secretary of 
State nor the Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research 
and Innovation has discussed the USS with Universities UK (UUK) 
or the University and College Union. Officials have sought updates 
from UUK on the latest developments regarding the USS. These 
were informal discussions and there were no outcomes.37 
The then Work and Pensions Secretary David Gauke said: 
Any changes that might be made to this scheme are a matter for 
the scheme’s joint negotiation committee, not for the 
Government. The independent Pensions Regulator remains in 
ongoing discussion with the USS’s stakeholders. Nothing has been 
brought to the DWP’s attention that we consider to be of 
concern. It would be improper for the Government to tell the joint 
negotiation committee how to run the scheme.38 
On 15 January 2018, BEIS Minister Sam Gyimah said: 
Universities are autonomous institutions and they are responsible 
for their own pension provision. The department has not taken 
steps to encourage Universities UK, or any other party, to resolve 
the dispute regarding the Universities Superannuation Scheme, 
but continues to monitor developments.39 
An Early Day Motion in the name of Carol Monaghan, with 65 
signatures, says: 
That this House recognises that academic staff in universities 
make a vital contribution to ensuring the supply of skilled 
graduates to UK businesses; believes all staff working in 
universities should have access to a secure and decent pension; 
notes with concern the proposal by Universities UK to close the 
defined benefit portion of the Universities Superannuation 
Scheme (USS) to all future service; further believes this would 
significantly reduce the security of retirement income for 
academic staff in many UK universities, making careers in those 
institutions less attractive; and calls on the Government to review 
the current situation and urge Universities UK to work with 
University and College Union to find a better solution which 
ensures that USS remains competitive compared with pensions 
offered to other education staff and those in other professional 
occupations.40 
 
                                                                                             
37  PQ 119989, 22 December 2017 
38  HC Deb 18 December 2017 c740 
39  PQ 121810, 15 January 2018 
40  Early day motion 619, 29 November 2017 
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